Why candidate divergence should be expected to be just as great (or even greater) in competitive seats as in non-competitive ones
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Open Access
- 22 December 2009
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 145 (3-4) , 417-433
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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