Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction
Authors:
- 1 February 2013
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 5 (1) , 100-146
Abstract
We propose a method to structurally estimate the deterministic component of bidder valuations in FCC spectrum auctions, and apply it to the 1995-1996 C block auction. We base estimation on a pairwise stability condition: two bidders cannot exchange two licenses in a way that increases the sum of their valuations. Pairwise stability holds in some theoretical models of simultaneous ascending auctions under intimidatory collusion and demand reduction. Pairwise stability results in a matching game approach to estimation. We find that a system of four large regional licenses would raise the allocative efficiency of the C block outcome by 48 percent. (JEL D44, D45, H82, L82)Keywords
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