The Choices Judges Make
Open Access
- 1 July 2000
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Theoretical Politics
- Vol. 12 (3) , 305-323
Abstract
In this paper we focus on the way in which courts affect public policy. We present a model of judicial behavior that combines insights from theories emphasizing the importance of policy preferences with those suggesting that courts are only motivated by formal-legal criteria. By embedding our model of judicial choice in a broader context of political decision-making we show how judges are able to affect policy and under what circumstances the judiciary will change their legal interpretations. The model is applied to decision-making by the Dutch Supreme Court on euthanasia to illustrate its main features.Keywords
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