Can Generative AI Be an Aesthetic Subject? An Analysis with Neuroaesthetic Evidence

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Abstract
In the contemporary realm of digital art, generative AI (GAI) systems, including text-to-image models, produce high-quality artworks within seconds, thereby disrupting the existing digital art ecosystem. This raises a pivotal question: can generative AI be regarded as an aesthetic subject? This inquiry represents a frontier issue situated at the crossroads of analytical aesthetics and neuroscience. An aesthetic subject is defined by the universal and non-utilitarian character of the emotions, pleasure, and judgments experienced during the aesthetic process. To determine whether generative AI qualifies as an aesthetic subject, reliance on mere intuition or technological observations is insufficient. Rather, it is necessary to revisit the notion of the “aesthetic subject” rooted in analytical philosophy and integrate it with recent advancements in neuroaesthetic evidence. This study examines the problem through seven lenses—aesthetic judgment; emotional internality; artistic imaginativity; meaning; artistic creativity; consciousness; and intentionality—while also comparing aesthetic functions with fundamental aesthetic distinctions. It provides a prudent evaluation of this matter. Specifically, the analysis proceeds from the simplest to the most complex components to determine their verifiability or falsifiability; subsequently, by integrating these findings, a comprehensive conclusion is drawn regarding the status of generative AI as an aesthetic subject. Adopting a stance of weak epistemology and utilizing the aforementioned theoretical framework, this paper concludes that, at present, generative artificial intelligence cannot be considered an aesthetic subject.

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