Making Models Count
- 1 July 2008
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 75 (3) , 383-404
Abstract
What sort of claims do scientific models make and how do these claims then underwrite empirical successes such as explanations and reliable policy interventions? In this paper I propose answers to these questions for the class of models used throughout the social and biological sciences, namely idealized deductive ones with a causal interpretation. I argue that the two main existing accounts misrepresent how these models are actually used, and propose a new account.Keywords
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