Public-Private Cooperation in Infrastructure Development: A Principal-Agent Story of Contingent Liabilities, Fiscal Risks, and Other (Un)pleasant Surprises
Author:
- 30 September 2009
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Networks and Spatial Economics
- Vol. 12 (2) , 223-237
Abstract
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