Director workloads, attendance and firm performance
Authors:
- Stephen GraySGStephen Gray
- John NowlandJNJohn Nowland
- 2 July 2018
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Accounting Research Journal
- Vol. 31 (2) , 214-231
Abstract
Purpose: This paper examines whether increased director workloads are benefiting firms or are causing directors to become too busy, resulting in lower director attendance and weaker firm performance.Design/methodology/approach: This paper conducts empirical analysis of the relationships between meeting frequency, director attendance rates and firm performance using archival data from Australia.Findings: Attendance rates for both outside and inside directors decrease as they are required to attend more meetings. The benefits firms obtain from holding additional meetings are significantly eroded by lower director attendance.Originality/value: This study brings together the literatures on meeting frequency, director busyness and firm performance to show that increased director workloads are only beneficial to firms if directors do not become too busy to fulfill their obligations to shareholders.Keywords
This publication has 30 references indexed in Scilit:
- Attendance of board meetings and company performance: Evidence from TaiwanJournal of Banking & Finance, 2013
- Outsider Board Activity, Ownership Structure and Firm Value: Evidence from KoreaInternational Review of Finance, 2013
- Is prior director experience valuable?Accounting & Finance, 2012
- Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance☆Journal of Financial Economics, 2009
- Electing DirectorsThe Journal of Finance, 2009
- Multiple Directorships and Corporate Performance in Australian Listed Companies*Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2006
- Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?The Journal of Finance, 2006
- Too Busy To Serve? An Examination of the Influence of Overboarded DirectorsJournal of Management Studies, 2004
- Board meeting frequency and firm performanceJournal of Financial Economics, 1999
- Separation of Ownership and ControlThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1983