The Shared Reward Dilemma
Authors:
- J. A. CuestaJCJ. A. Cuesta
- R. JimenezRJR. Jimenez
Preprint
Abstract
One of the most direct human mechanisms of promoting cooperation is rewarding it. We study the effect of sharing a reward among cooperators in the most stringent form of social dilemma. Thus, individuals confront a new dilemma: on the one hand, they may be inclined to choose the shared reward despite the possibility of being exploited by defectors; on the other hand, if too many players do that, cooperators will obtain a poor reward and defectors will outperform them. By appropriately tuning the amount to be shared we can cast a vast variety of scenarios, including traditional ones in the study of cooperation as well as more complex situations where unexpected behavior can occur. We provide a complete classification of the equilibria of the $n$-player game as well as of the evolutionary dynamics. Beyond, we extend our analysis to a general class of public good games where competition among individuals with the same strategy exists.Keywords
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