Discounted Stochastic Games
Author:
- 1 November 1998
- journal article
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Mathematics of Operations Research
- Vol. 23 (4) , 1010-1021
Abstract
We give an alternative proof to a result of Mertens and Parthasarathy, stating that every n-player discounted stochastic game with general setup, and with a norm-continuous transition, has a subgame perfect equilibrium.Keywords
This publication has 6 references indexed in Scilit:
- Stationary Markov EquilibriaEconometrica, 1994
- Existence of Stationary Correlated Equilibria with Symmetric Information for Discounted Stochastic GamesMathematics of Operations Research, 1992
- Nonzero-Sum Stochastic Games1991
- Measurable relationsFundamenta Mathematicae, 1975
- Equilibrium in a stochastic $n$-person gameHiroshima Mathematical Journal, 1964
- Stochastic GamesProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 1953