Abstract
Problem definition: We identify and formalize a distinct co-opetition practice-layered co-opetition-in which an asset-controlling firm supplies a downstream rival with a service-enabling input and access to a capacity-constrained complementary asset while continuing to compete with it for end users. Sharing can improve service quality, expand demand, and increase asset utilization, but it can also strengthen the rival, intensify competition, and increase congestion. We study when this arrangement benefits both firms and how procurement contracts allocate value across layers. Methodology/results: Using EV mobility as a canonical application, we develop a game-theoretic model in which consumers choose between the firms based on service prices and congestion. We compare independent competition, where the rival uses an outside supplier and alternative facilities, with coopetition under a uniform wholesale-price contract or a scale-contingent quantity-discount contract. Gross value creation does not guarantee mutual gain: shared access must create enough value to offset the rival's forgone outside option and the competitive and congestion costs of sharing. Counterintuitively, greater complementary-service value can induce the asset owner to lower the rival's procurement price. Because the rival's customers continue to generate procurement and complementary-service revenue, the asset owner also competes less aggressively for them. Quantity discounts can sustain mutual gains where wholesale pricing cannot, but do not uniformly dominate: the expansion they induce can intensify competition and congestion, leaving other settings viable only under wholesale pricing. Within the maintained low-friction domain, firm-level mutual profitability does not determine stakeholder performance, which depends on how the quantity discount is implemented. Managerial implications: Managers should jointly assess complementary-service value, the rival's outside option, competition, congestion, and value allocation. A more profitable complementary layer can warrant softer procurement terms; greater contractual flexibility need not improve performance; and mutual profitability need not imply better outcomes for consumers or the focal system.