CEO duality, CEO compensation, and earnings management: Evidence from China
Authors:
Open Access
- 16 June 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Virtus Interpress in Corporate Ownership and Control
- Vol. 20 (3, special) , 317
Abstract
This paper investigates whether chief executive officer (CEO) duality and CEO compensation influence earnings management. We obtain the data of the A-shares companies listed in both the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) from the Chinese Securities Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. Using a sample of 8,419 firm-year observations of 881 unique listed companies in China from 2011–2022, we find that the firms with CEO duality exhibit a higher level of earnings management, through both discretionary accruals and real activities. In addition, CEOs with higher cash-based compensation are more likely to engage in earnings management, while CEOs with higher equity-based incentives are less likely to engage in real earnings management. We further examine the moderating role of CEO duality and find that CEOs who also chair the board are more likely to engage in real earnings management. Additional analysis shows that state-owned companies are less likely to engage in earnings management activities. However, equity-based compensation provides incremental incentives for the CEOs of state-owned companies to manage earnings through accruals rather than real activities.Keywords
Funding Information
- Wenzhou-Kean University (IRSPG 202205)
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