Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Antimedian Voter Theorem
Authors:
- 18 June 2013
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 58 (1) , 127-143
Abstract
We study a citizen‐candidate‐entry model with private information about ideal points. We fully characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of the entry game and show that only relatively “extreme” citizen types enter the electoral competition as candidates, whereas more “moderate” types never enter. It generally leads to substantial political polarization, even when the electorate is not polarized and citizens understand that they vote for more extreme candidates. We show that polarization increases in the costs of entry and decreases in the benefits from holding office. Moreover, when the number of citizens goes to infinity, only the very most extreme citizens, with ideal points at the boundary of the policy space, become candidates. Finally, our polarization result is robust to changes in the implementation of a default policy if no citizen runs for office and to introducing directional information about candidates’ types that is revealed via parties.Keywords
Funding Information
- National Science Foundation (SES-0962802)
This publication has 26 references indexed in Scilit:
- Leapfrog Representation and Extremism: A Study of American Voters and Their Members in CongressAmerican Political Science Review, 2010
- Political Polarization in the American PublicAnnual Review of Political Science, 2008
- The Strength of Issues: Using Multiple Measures to Gauge Preference Stability, Ideological Constraint, and Issue VotingAmerican Political Science Review, 2008
- Multiple Equilibria in the Citizen‐Candidate Model of Representative DemocracyJournal of Public Economic Theory, 2002
- An Informational Rationale for Political PartiesAmerican Journal of Political Science, 2002
- Stability and Coordination in Duverger's Law: A Formal Model of Preelection Polls and Strategic VotingAmerican Political Science Review, 1997
- A Voting Model Implying Duverger's Law and Positive TurnoutAmerican Journal of Political Science, 1992
- Rational Voting and Candidate Entry under Plurality RuleAmerican Journal of Political Science, 1990
- The Relationship between Information, Ideology, and Voting BehaviorAmerican Journal of Political Science, 1987
- The Polarization of American PoliticsThe Journal of Politics, 1984