Bank supervision Russian style: Evidence of conflicts between micro- and macro-prudential concerns
Authors:
- Sophie ClaeysSCSophie Claeys
- Koen SchoorsKSKoen Schoors
- 1 September 2007
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Comparative Economics
- Vol. 35 (3) , 630-657
Abstract
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This publication has 30 references indexed in Scilit:
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