How minds can be computational systems
Author:
- William J. RapaportWRWilliam J. Rapaport
- 1 October 1998
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 10 (4) , 403-419
Abstract
The proper treatment of computationalism, as the thesis that cognition is computable, is presented and defended. Some arguments of James H. Fetzer against computationalism are examined and found wanting, and his positive theory of minds as semiotic systems is shown to be consistent with computationalism. An objection is raised to an argument of Selmer Bringsjord against one strand of computationalism, namely, that Turing-Test-passing artifacts are persons, it is argued that, whether or not this objection holds, such artifacts will inevitably be persons.Keywords
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