From Tarski to Gödel—or how to derive the second incompleteness theorem from the undefinability of truth without self-reference
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Open Access
- 8 March 2019
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Logic and Computation
- Vol. 29 (5) , 595-604
Abstract
In this paper, we provide a fairly general self-reference-free proof of the second incompleteness theorem from Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability of truth.Keywords
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