Theory of Mind in the Wild: Toward Tackling the Challenges of Everyday Mental State Reasoning
Open Access
- 12 September 2013
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 8 (9) , e72835
Abstract
A complete understanding of the cognitive systems underwriting theory of mind (ToM) abilities requires articulating how mental state representations are generated and processed in everyday situations. Individuals rarely announce their intentions prior to acting, and actions are often consistent with multiple mental states. In order for ToM to operate effectively in such situations, mental state representations should be generated in response to certain actions, even when those actions occur in the presence of mental state content derived from other aspects of the situation. Results from three experiments with preschool children and adults demonstrate that mental state information is indeed generated based on an approach action cue in situations that contain competing mental state information. Further, the frequency with which participants produced or endorsed explanations that include mental states about an approached object decreased when the competing mental state information about a different object was made explicit. This set of experiments provides some of the first steps toward identifying the observable action cues that are used to generate mental state representations in everyday situations and offers insight into how both young children and adults processes multiple mental state representations.Keywords
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