Abstract
Spectrum scarcity in 5G and beyond (B5G) poses a major challenge to wireless resource allocation. Existing spectrum allocation frameworks, however, often struggle to jointly capture heterogeneous user equipment (UE) demand, economic incentives, and real-time implementability. To address this challenge, this paper proposes a utility-aware, market-driven framework for dynamic pricing and bandwidth allocation. Specifically, we formulate a two-stage Stackelberg game, in which the mobile network operator (MNO) acts as the leader and sets user-specific prices to enable effective price discrimination, while each UE acts as a follower and determines its bandwidth demand by maximizing individual utility. We establish the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium and derive tractable closed-form expressions for the corresponding pricing and band width strategies under both general and high-SNR regimes, with an extension to reuse-enabled spectrum sharing. Numerical results validate the analytical equilibrium and show that the proposed mechanism effectively regulates strategic UE demand while achieving a more favorable trade-off between MNO utility and UE satisfaction compared with conventional baselines.
Funding Information
  • National Natural Science Foundation of China (62571125)
  • Jiangsu Industry Outlook and Key Technology Research Project (BE2023093-2)
  • Key Technologies R&D Program of Jiangsu (BE2023022-1)

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