Turning a Blind Eye: Costly Enforcement, Credible Commitment and Minimum Wage Laws
Authors:
- 25 August 2009
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 120 (543) , 244-269
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 29 references indexed in Scilit:
- A theory of employment guarantees: Contestability, credibility and distributional concernsJournal of Public Economics, 2009
- Courts of Law and Unforeseen ContingenciesThe Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2006
- Measuring the Impact of Minimum Wages2004
- Oligopsony and Monopsonistic Competition in Labor MarketsJournal of Economic Perspectives, 2002
- Strategic Amnesty and Credible Immigration ReformJournal of Labor Economics, 2001
- The Impact of Minimum Wages in Mexico and ColombiaJournal of Labor Economics, 1997
- The Impact of Labor Market RegulationsThe World Bank Economic Review, 1997
- The ‘perverse’ effects of wage and price controls in search marketsEuropean Economic Review, 1994
- On the Economics of Compliance with the Minimum Wage LawJournal of Political Economy, 1985
- Compliance with the Minimum Wage LawJournal of Political Economy, 1979