• 1 January 2019
Abstract
How does forced migration affect the politics of host states and, in particular, how does it impact upon states’ foreign policy decision-making? The relevant literature on refugee politics has yet to fully explore how forced migration encourages host states to employ their position in order to extract revenue from other state or non-state actors for maintaining refugee groups within their borders. This article explores the workings of refugee rentier states, namely states seeking to leverage their position as host states of displaced communities for material gain. It focuses on the Syrian refugee crisis, examining the foreign-policy responses of three major host states – Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. While all three engaged in post-2011 refugee rent-seeking behavior, Jordan and Lebanon deployed a backscratching strategy based on bargains, while Turkey deployed a blackmailing strategy based on threats. Employing primary sources in English and Arabic, the article inductively examines how the choice of strategy depended on the host state’s size of refugee community and domestic elites’ perception of their state’s geostrategic importance vis-à-vis the target state(s). The article concludes with a discussion on the significance of its findings for understanding the international dimension of the Syrian refugee crisis and paves the way for future research on the effects of forced displacement on host states’ political development.
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