Abstract
SRAM Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) derive secret keys from start-up values for inherent security benefits but suffer from reliability issues due to bit flipping. We introduce the Threshold-based Majority Voting Scheme (TMVS), a lightweight method that eliminates noise and mitigates bias in SRAM PUFs while retaining the simplicity of majority voting decoders used by repetition codes, without the significant entropy loss that repetition codes incur under biased responses. TMVS runs entirely in software, requires no cell-level bit-error rate qualification or SRAM redesign, and avoids the complex decoders of heavy error correcting codes. We derive closed-form expressions for decoding-error probability and expected memory, validate them on experimental data, and present a security analysis that provides exact formulas for min-entropy and secrecy leakage due to helper data and bias, identifying conditions under which TMVS achieves zero secrecy leakage. On a large public dataset, TMVS shows near-zero cross-chip secrecy leakage and preserves average conditional min-entropy above 1 bit despite biased, spatially correlated SRAM statistics. Compared with prior work, TMVS offers the smallest decoding complexity at the cost of a larger PUF size. In a representative configuration, TMVS generates a 128-bit key with failure probability 9.15 · 10−6 and zero secrecy leakage at a bit-flip probability of 10%, requiring only ∼ 248k clock cycles on a 32-bit ARM Cortex-M0. These results show that TMVS is practical and implementation-friendly for resource-constrained, low-power devices.
Funding Information
  • European Union’s Horizon Europe Framework Programme through the OpenSwarm Project (101093046)