The design of payment systems for physicians under global budget – an experimental study
Authors:
- Chinn-Ping FanCFChinn-Ping Fan
- Kong-Pin ChenKCKong-Pin Chen
- Kamhon KanKKKamhon Kan
- 1 February 1998
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 34 (2) , 295-311
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
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