Stabilizing Large Financial Institutions with Contingent Capital Certificates
Preprint
- 1 January 2009
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
The financial crisis has clearly indicated that government regulators are reluctant to permit a large financial institution to fail. In order to minimize the trKeywords
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