Abstract
In densely populated and economically active regions, nature conservation is facing increasing pressure from competing demands for land use. While publicly financed subsidies are a critical policy tool to incentivize conservation, existing studies often overlook how different subsidy allocations between public stakeholders (e.g., municipal governments) and private stakeholders (e.g., nature managers) influence their behavior, interactions, and ultimately, conservation outcomes. This study addresses this gap by applying a spatially explicit land-use simulation model that integrates stakeholder interactions to assess how different subsidy allocations affect nature land protection in the Randstad, Netherlands.Three scenarios were developed to represent distinct subsidy arrangements between public and private stakeholders: (1) subsidies fully allocated to nature managers, (2) subsidies fully allocated to municipal governments, and (3) equal distribution to both stakeholders. Results show that incorporating stakeholder interactions significantly improves land-use modeling accuracy. Moreover, incorporating stakeholder interactions allows the model to capture potential spatial variations in conservation preferences among stakeholders under different subsidy allocations. These conflicts largely shape the different spatial patterns of nature land gains and losses across the region.The results highlight the importance of region-specific and goal-oriented strategies. In vulnerable nature areas facing intense urban or agriculture expansion, prioritizing subsidies to local nature managers is most effective in preventing fragmented nature loss. Conversely, in areas with high ecological potential near existing nature land, supporting municipal governments facilitates large-scale nature restoration. These findings highlight the critical role of aligning economic incentives with stakeholder roles and preferences to resolve conflicts and enhance the effectiveness of nature conservation policies.

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