Indirect reciprocity with optional games and monitoring of interactions between defectors
- 1 April 2019
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Biosciences
- Vol. 310, 108-119
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- John Templeton Foundation (OPP1148627, CA179991, N00014-16-1-2914)
- National Cancer Institute (OPP1148627, CA179991, N00014-16-1-2914)
- Samsung (OPP1148627, CA179991, N00014-16-1-2914)
- Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (OPP1148627, CA179991, N00014-16-1-2914)
- Office of Naval Research (OPP1148627, CA179991, N00014-16-1-2914)
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