Signaling, Globality, and the Intuitive Criterion
Preprint
- 1 May 2004
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
A global signaling game is a sender-receiver game in which the sender is only imperfectly informed about the receiver's preferences. The paper considers an economically relevant class of signaling games that possess more than one Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. For this class of games, it is shown that a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is unaffected by a small perturbation of the information structure if and only if it is consistent with a criterion suggested by Cho and Kreps (1987). Moreover, the equilibrium in the global signaling game is essentially unique.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 42 references indexed in Scilit:
- Strong Belief and Forward Induction ReasoningJournal of Economic Theory, 2002
- Noise-Proof Equilibria in Two-Action Signaling GamesJournal of Economic Theory, 1997
- Global Games and Equilibrium SelectionEconometrica, 1993
- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibriumJournal of Economic Theory, 1991
- Signaling Games and Stable EquilibriaThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1987
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling GamesEconometrica, 1987
- On the Strategic Stability of EquilibriaEconometrica, 1986
- Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete InformationMathematics of Operations Research, 1985
- Job Market SignalingThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1973
- 28. Mixed and Behavior Strategies in Infinite Extensive Games1964