Technical complexity, regionalism, and decision-making: Case processing outcomes in EPA's toxic substances program
- 1 September 1998
- journal article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Social Science Journal
- Vol. 35 (3) , 377-392
Abstract
In this article, I explore the effect of the technical complexity of decisions on the nature of the relationship between agents and their political leaders and contextual pressures. I examine this within the regional context of The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) toxic substances enforcement. The results suggest that case characteristics are important in both routine and complex cases. Moreover, responsiveness toward national and regional preferences occurs to some extent in all models. With more technically complex decisions, however, this responsiveness is more pronounced and diversified. This lends support for hypotheses derived from a bounded rationality theory of agency actions.Keywords
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