Epistemic Groundings of Abstraction and Their Cognitive Dimension
- 1 July 2011
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 78 (3) , 490-511
Abstract
In the philosophy of science, abstraction has usually been analyzed in terms of the interface between our experience and the design of our concepts. The often implicit assumption here is that such interface has a definite identifiable and universalizable structure, determining the epistemic correctness of any abstraction. Our claim is that, on the contrary, the epistemic grounding of abstraction should not be reduced to the structural norms of such interface but is also related to the constraints on the cognitive processes of specific abstractions. This suggests that we should understand abstraction as embodied in different kinds of abstraction practices.Keywords
This publication has 22 references indexed in Scilit:
- Drawing into abstraction. Practices of observation and visualisation in the work of Santiago Ramón y CajalInterdisciplinary Science Reviews, 2008
- The interactivist modelSynthese, 2008
- Grounded CognitionAnnual Review of Psychology, 2008
- Mathematical IdealizationPhilosophy of Science, 2007
- The Heuristic Structure of Scientific KnowledgeJournal of Cognition and Culture, 2004
- Embodied Cognition: A field guideArtificial Intelligence, 2003
- The roots of scientific reasoning: infancy, modularity and the art of tracking2002
- Why Children Don't Have to Solve the Frame Problems: Cognitive Representations Are Not EncodingsDevelopmental Review, 2001
- Metaphoric structuring: understanding time through spatial metaphorsCognition, 2000
- The Dappled World1999