The Epistemological Status of Computer-Assisted Proofs
Author:
- 20 September 2007
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Philosophia Mathematica
- Vol. 16 (3) , 374-387
Abstract
Several high-profile mathematical problems have been solved in recent decades by computer-assisted proofs. Some philosophers have argued that such proofs are a posteriori on the grounds that some such proofs are unsurveyable; that our warrant for accepting these proofs involves empirical claims about the reliability of computers; that there might be errors in the computer or program executing the proof; and that appeal to computer introduces into a proof an experimental element. I argue that none of these arguments withstands scrutiny, and so there is no reason to believe that computer-assisted proofs are not a priori.Keywords
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