Secure key-exchange protocol with an absence of injective functions
Authors:
- 4 December 2002
- journal article
- research article
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review E
- Vol. 66 (6) , 066102
Abstract
The security of neural cryptography is investigated. A key-exchange protocol over a public channel is studied where the parties exchanging secret messages use multilayer neural networks which are trained by their mutual output bits and synchronize to a time dependent secret key. The weights of the networks have integer values between Recently an algorithm for an eavesdropper which could break the key was introduced by [A. Shamir, A. Mityagin, and A. Klimov, Ramp Session (Eurocrypt, Amsterdam, 2002)]. We show that the synchronization time increases with while the probability to find a successful attacker decreases exponentially with L. Hence for large L we find a secure key-exchange protocol which depends neither on number theory nor on injective trapdoor functions used in conventional cryptography.
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This publication has 4 references indexed in Scilit:
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