Are Long-Term Investors 'Underweight Long-Term' in Public Equity?

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Abstract
Pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, endowments, foundations, and family offices routinely claim patience and a long-term horizon as structural advantages. But while public equity is a meaningful allocation for all of them, it is unclear how much exposure is actually built to leverage patience and time horizon. Resolving this conundrum is the central aim of this paper. To clarify, we call an active public-equity exposure ‘long-horizon’ only when four things are true at once: the portfolio is meaningfully different from its benchmark; its return comes from the economic performance of the underlying businesses rather than from the repricing of their shares; the capital underpinning it can stay invested through stretches of relative underperformance; and it is judged based on how those businesses perform and on whether the manager held to the process they described, with relative return never decisive inside five years. On this standard, we hypothesize that most long-term investors are ‘underweight long term’ in active public equity. The cause of the public-equity short-termism of these investors, we argue, is a cascade: evaluation pressure runs from boards to chief investment officers, and from CIOs to managers. The mandates that result from this cascade depend on the market re-rating a holding within roughly three to twenty-four months. We call that time-band the middle horizon. Each link in the cascade behaves rationally given the incentives it faces. But the chain as a whole screens for mandates that show near-term validation, and managers adapt their research, portfolio construction, risk systems, communications, and hiring to the clocks that govern the capital they are given. Stated as four conditions, long-termism becomes something an investor can measure across its own book. And the claim to be a long-term investor emerges as a claim that can actually be checked.

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