Frequency-dependent strategy selection in a hunting game with a finite population
Authors:
- Shuai ZhangSZShuai Zhang
- Ruaridh ClarkRCRuaridh Clark
- Yunke HuangYHYunke Huang
- 1 October 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Applied Mathematics and Computation
- Vol. 382
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
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