THE ROLE OF STATE‐REINFORCED SELF‐GOVERNANCE IN AVERTING THE TRAGEDY OF THE IRRIGATION COMMONS IN JAPAN
- 11 February 2013
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration
- Vol. 91 (3) , 727-743
Abstract
The scholarly works on governance alternatives are peppered with arguments suggesting that, to avert the tragedy of the commons, the state should coerce resource users to manage the commons; take authoritarian ownership of it; privatize it; co‐manage it with users, or, since the state may also destroy self‐governing institutions of users, stay away so that users can develop self‐governing institutions for management. This article examines the management of the irrigation commons in post‐war Japan and explores a unique policy alternative termed ‘state‐reinforced self‐governance’. It allows a financially, technologically, statutorily, and politically strong state to assist strategically, rather than coerce, users to self‐govern and avert the tragedy of the commons.Keywords
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