Revenue Sharing and Competitive Balance
Author:
- 1 February 2005
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Sports Economics
- Vol. 6 (1) , 98-106
Abstract
This short article, challenging the so-called invariance proposition, argues that, for a general n-team model with profit-maximizing clubs and concave revenue functions, there are reasons to believe that revenue sharing can worsen the competitive balance among teams in a professional sports league. If clubs are win maximizers, revenue sharing improves the competitive balance.Keywords
All Related Versions
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