Carving the Mind at its (Not Necessarily Modular) Joints
Author:
- 1 June 2001
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 52 (2) , 277-302
Abstract
The cognitive enuropsychological understanding of a cognitive system is roughly that of a ‘mental organ’, which is independent of other systems, specializes in some cognitive task, and exhibits a certain kind of internal cohesiveness. This is all quite vague, and I try to make it more precise. A more precise understanding of cognitive systems will make it possible to articulate in some detail an alternative to the Fodorian doctrine of modularity (since not all cognitive systems are modules), but it will also provide a better understanding of what a module is (since all modules are cognitive systems).Keywords
This publication has 15 references indexed in Scilit:
- Modularity and cognitionTrends in Cognitive Sciences, 1999
- Evolutionary Psychology and the Massive Modularity HypothesisThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1998
- On the Methods of Cognitive NeuropsychologyThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1994
- Separate visual pathways for perception and actionTrends in Neurosciences, 1992
- The case for single-patient studiesCognitive Neuropsychology, 1988
- On drawing inferences about the structure of normal cognitive systems from the analysis of patterns of impaired performance: The case for single-patient studiesBrain and Cognition, 1986
- Human image understanding: Recent research and a theoryComputer Vision, Graphics, and Image Processing, 1985
- Object vision and spatial vision: two cortical pathwaysTrends in Neurosciences, 1983
- Rules and representationsBehavioral and Brain Sciences, 1980
- Hearing lips and seeing voicesNature, 1976