Explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant, or inference to the best explanation meets Bayesian confirmation theory
Authors:
- William RocheWRWilliam Roche
- Elliott SoberESElliott Sober
- 1 October 2013
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 73 (4) , 659-668
Abstract
In the world of philosophy of science, the dominant theory of confirmation is Bayesian. In the wider philosophical world, the idea of inference to the best explanation exerts a considerable influence. Here we place the two worlds in collision, using Bayesian confirmation theory to argue that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant.Keywords
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