Leadership with individual rewards and punishments
Authors:
- Özgür GürerkÖGÖzgür Gürerk
- Thomas LauerThomas Lauer
- Martin ScheuermannMSMartin Scheuermann
- 1 June 2018
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 74, 57-69
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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Funding Information
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (GU 954/3, LA 3372/1)
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