Game-Theoretic Models of Incentive and Control Strategies in Social and Economic Systems
Authors:
- 6 May 2015
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Cybernetics and Systems
- Vol. 46 (5) , 303-319
Abstract
This study classifies and analyzes incentive systems in social and economic spheres on the methodological basis of game theory. The proposed approach formalizes the assumption of the impossibility of precise performance in socioeconomic realms, which is fundamental for designing incentive systems. The suggested approach addresses latent strategic variables that characterize the behavior of active elements of incentive systems. The authors define, formalize, and characterize authoritarian and democratic systems and mechanisms of incentive and control and demonstrate that a democratic system can significantly reduce incentive and control costs.Keywords
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