A Theory of Hard and Soft Information
Authors:
- 1 March 2015
- journal article
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 91 (1) , 1-20
Abstract
We study optimal disclosure via two competing communication channels: hard information whose value has been verified, and soft disclosures such as forecasts, unaudited statements, and press releases. We show that certain soft disclosures may contain as much information as hard disclosures, and we establish that: (1) exclusive reliance on soft disclosures tends to convey bad news, (2) credibility is greater when unfavorable information is reported, and (3) misreporting is more likely when soft information is issued jointly with hard information. We also show that a soft report that is seemingly unbiased in expectation need not indicate truthful reporting. We demonstrate that mandatory disclosure of hard information reduces the transmission of soft information, and that the aggregation of hard with soft information will turn all information soft. JEL Classifications: D72; D82; D83; G20.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 48 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Nature and Implications of Acquisition GoodwillSSRN Electronic Journal, 2012
- Conservatism and Aggregation: The Effect on Cost of Equity Capital and the Efficiency of Debt ContractsSSRN Electronic Journal, 2012
- The Value of Confession: Admitting Mistakes to Build ReputationSSRN Electronic Journal, 2011
- Persuasion by Cheap TalkAmerican Economic Review, 2010
- Prior Forecasting Accuracy and Investor Reaction to Management Earnings ForecastsSSRN Electronic Journal, 2009
- Do Investors Perceive Marking-to-Model as Marking-to-Myth? Early Evidence from FAS 157 DisclosureSSRN Electronic Journal, 2008
- Imperfect Information and Credible CommunicationJournal of Accounting Research, 2001
- Credibility of Voluntary DisclosureThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2000
- Accounting and the credibility of management forecasts*Contemporary Accounting Research, 1992
- Truthful Disclosure of InformationThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1982