Competitive equilibria in Shapley–Scarf markets with couples
Authors:
- Fatma AslanFAFatma Aslan
- Jean LainéJLJean Lainé
- 1 August 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 89, 66-78
Abstract
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Funding Information
- National Research, Development and Innovation Fund (TUDFO/51757/2019-ITM)
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