Complexity of and algorithms for the manipulation of Borda, Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules
Authors:
- Jessica DaviesJDJessica Davies
- George KatsirelosGKGeorge Katsirelos
- Nina NarodytskaNNNina Narodytska
- Toby WalshTWToby Walsh
- Lirong XiaLXLirong Xia
- 1 December 2014
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 217, 20-42
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Agence Nationale de la Recherche
- Australian Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy
- Australian Research Council (08-BLAN-0289-01)
- Asian Office of Aerospace Research and Development (AOARD-104123)
- Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung
- Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
- National Science Foundation (1136996)
- Vincent Conitzer's NSF CAREER (0953756, IIS-0812113)
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