Does Universalism Entail Extensionalism?
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Abstract
Does a commitment to mereological universalism automatically bring along a commitment to the controversial doctrine of mereologicalextensionalism—the view that objects with the same proper parts are identical? A recent argument suggests the answer is ‘yes’. This paper attempts a systematic response to the argument, considering nearly every available line of reply. It argues that only one approach—themutual partsview—can yield a viable mereology where universalism does not entail extensionalism.Keywords
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