Tobin's Q Does Not Measure Performance: Theory, Empirics, and Alternative Measures
Authors:
Preprint
- 1 January 2011
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Tobin's q is often used to proxy for firm performance when studying the relation between corporate governance and firm performance. However, our theoretical and empirical analysis demonstrate that Tobin's q does not measure firm performance since underinvestment increases rather than decreases Tobin's q. As an alternative to Tobin's q, our theoretical framework provides two new operating efficiency measures: the first assesses scale efficiency and the second assesses cost discipline. These proxies are justified by the ideal of maximizing firm value net of invested capital, and can be computed for a wide cross-section of firms. In a canonical governance-performance regression specification, our operating efficiency measures lead to a different conclusion than Tobin's q.Keywords
This publication has 25 references indexed in Scilit:
- Innovation and Institutional OwnershipAmerican Economic Review, 2013
- Treating Measurement Error in Tobin'sqThe Review of Financial Studies, 2011
- Innovation and Institutional Ownership2009
- Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More?The Journal of Finance, 2009
- What Matters in Corporate Governance?The Review of Financial Studies, 2008
- Board classification and managerial entrenchment: Evidence from the market for corporate controlJournal of Financial Economics, 2008
- Governance Mechanisms and Equity PricesThe Journal of Finance, 2005
- Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial PreferencesJournal of Political Economy, 2003
- Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500The Journal of Finance, 2003
- Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performanceJournal of Financial Economics, 1999