A Denial a Day Keeps the Doctor Away
Open Access
- 28 June 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 139 (1) , 187-233
Abstract
Who bears the consequences of administrative problems in health care? We use data on repeated interactions between a large sample of U.S. physicians and many different insurers to document the complexity of health care billing, and estimate its economic costs for doctors and consequences for patients. Observing the back-and-forth sequences of claim denials and resubmissions for past visits, we can estimate physicians’ costs of haggling with insurers to collect payments. Combining these costs with the revenue never collected, we estimate that physicians lose 18% of Medicaid revenue to billing problems, compared with 4.7% for Medicare and 2.4% for commercial insurers. Identifying off of physician movers and practices that span state boundaries, we find that physicians respond to billing problems by refusing to accept Medicaid patients in states with more severe billing hurdles. These hurdles are quantitatively just as important as payment rates for explaining variation in physicians’ willingness to treat Medicaid patients. We conclude that administrative frictions have first-order costs for doctors, patients, and equality of access to health care. We quantify the potential economic gains—in terms of reduced public spending or increased access to physicians—if these frictions could be reduced and find them to be sizable.Keywords
This publication has 56 references indexed in Scilit:
- Physicians May Need More Than Higher Reimbursements To Expand Medicaid Participation: Findings From Washington StateHealth Affairs, 2013
- Estimating Welfare in Insurance Markets Using Variation in Prices*The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2010
- What Does It Cost Physician Practices To Interact With Health Insurance Plans?Health Affairs, 2009
- Do Reimbursement Delays Discourage Medicaid Participation By Physicians?Health Affairs, 2008
- The Pricing Of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind A Veil Of SecrecyHealth Affairs, 2006
- Insurance Fraud and Optimal Claims Settlement StrategiesThe Journal of Law and Economics, 2002
- Explaining Recent Declines in Food Stamp Program ParticipationBrookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs, 2001
- Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?Econometrica, 1999
- High Wage Workers and High Wage FirmsEconometrica, 1999
- Is Honesty the Best Policy? Curtailing Insurance Fraud through Optimal Incentive ContractsJournal of Political Economy, 1998