UNREFLECTIVE ACTION AND THE ARGUMENT FROM SPEED
Author:
- 4 August 2011
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
- Vol. 92 (3) , 338-362
Abstract
Hubert Dreyfus has defended a novel view of agency, most notably in his debate with John McDowell. Dreyfus argues that expert actions are primarily unreflective and do not involve conceptual activity. In unreflective action, embodied know‐how plays the role reflection and conceptuality play in the actions of novices. Dreyfus employs two arguments to support his conclusion:the argument from speedandthe phenomenological argument. I argue that Dreyfus's argumentative strategies are not successful, since he relies on a dubious assumption about concepts and reflection. I suggest that Dreyfus is committed to a minimal view of conceptuality in action.Keywords
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