ESTIMATING ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL HAZARD EFFECTS WITH HOSPITAL INVOICES DATA IN A GOVERNMENT‐CONTROLLED HEALTHCARE SYSTEM
- 6 June 2011
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Health Economics
- Vol. 21 (8) , 883-901
Abstract
SUMMARY: We use invoices for hospital services from a regional hospital in Croatia to test for adverse selection and moral hazard. There are three categories of patients: with no supplemental insurance, who bought it, and who are entitled to it for free. Our identification procedure relies on the premise that the difference in the observed medical care consumption between the patients who bought the insurance and those entitled to free insurance is caused by pure selection effect, whereas the difference in healthcare consumption between the group that received the free insurance and the group that has no insurance is due to moral hazard. Results show favorable selection for patients in 20‐ to 30‐year‐old cohort and significant moral hazard for all age cohorts. The selection effect reverses its sign in older cohorts explained by the differences in risk aversion across cohorts caused by the timing of transition from socialism to market economy. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Keywords
This publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
- Moral hazard and the demand for health services: A matching estimator approachJournal of Health Economics, 2008
- Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance MarketJournal of Political Economy, 2008
- Asymmetric information in insurance: general testable implicationsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2006
- Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance MarketAmerican Economic Review, 2006
- Large Sample Properties of Matching Estimators for Average Treatment EffectsEconometrica, 2005
- Propensity Score-Matching Methods for Nonexperimental Causal StudiesReview of Economics and Statistics, 2002
- An econometric model of health care utilization and health insurance in SwitzerlandEuropean Economic Review, 1998
- Matching As An Econometric Evaluation EstimatorReview of Economic Studies, 1998
- A Microeconometric Model of the Demand for Health Care and Health Insurance in AustraliaReview of Economic Studies, 1988
- Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect InformationThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1976