How Valuable Are Chances?
Authors:
- H. Orri StefánssonHSH. Orri Stefánsson
- Richard BradleyRBRichard Bradley
- 1 October 2015
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 82 (4) , 602-625
Abstract
Chance Neutrality is the thesis that, conditional on some proposition being true (or being false), its chance of being true should be a matter of practical indifference. The aim of this article is to examine whether Chance Neutrality is a requirement of rationality. We prove that given Chance Neutrality, the Principal Principle entails a thesis called Linearity; the centerpiece of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s expected utility theory. With this in mind, we argue that the Principal Principle is a requirement of practical rationality but that Linearity is not and, hence, that Chance Neutrality is not rationally required.Keywords
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