Abstract
The MIPI (Mobile Industry Processor Interface) Alliance provides a security framework for in-vehicle network connections between sensors and processing electronic control units (ECUs). One approach within this framework is data integrity verification for sensors with limited hardware resources. In this paper, the security risks associated with image sensor data are described. Adversarial examples (AEs) targeting the MIPI interface can induce misclassification, making image data integrity verification essential. A CMOS image sensor with a message authentication code (CIS-MAC) is then proposed as a defense mechanism starting from the image sensor to protect image data from malicious manipulations, such as AE attacks. Evaluation results of the physically unclonable function (PUF) response and random number, which are utilized for generating the cryptographic key and MAC tag, are presented using a 2 Mpixel CMOS image sensor. The area of the CIS-MAC circuit is estimated based on a Verilog HDL design and synthesis using a 0.18 μm CMOS process. Various hash topologies are evaluated to select a hash function suitable for key generation and MAC tag generation within the CMOS image sensor. The estimated area of the CIS-MAC circuit is 67 kGE and 0.86mm2, demonstrating feasibility for implementation in a CMOS image sensor typically fabricated using analog process technology.
Funding Information
  • Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JP24K15001)

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