A geometric approach to the price of anarchy in nonatomic congestion games
Authors:
- José R. CorreaJCJosé R. Correa
- Andreas S. SchulzASAndreas S. Schulz
- Nicolás E. Stier-MosesNSNicolás E. Stier-Moses
- 1 November 2008
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 64 (2) , 457-469
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 19 references indexed in Scilit:
- Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion gamesGames and Economic Behavior, 2004
- Social optimality and cooperation in nonatomic congestion gamesJournal of Economic Theory, 2004
- The price of anarchy is independent of the network topologyJournal of Computer and System Sciences, 2003
- The price of anarchy for non-atomic congestion games with symmetric cost maps and elastic demandsOperations Research Letters, 2003
- How bad is selfish routing?Journal of the ACM, 2002
- Side constrained traffic equilibrium models— analysis, computation and applicationsTransportation Research Part B: Methodological, 1999
- An augmented lagrangean dual algorithm for link capacity side constrained traffic assignment problemsTransportation Research Part B: Methodological, 1995
- A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibriaInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1973
- Equilibrium points of nonatomic gamesJournal of Statistical Physics, 1973
- ROAD PAPER. SOME THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF ROAD TRAFFIC RESEARCH.Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, 1952