Optimal Retention in Agency Problems
Authors:
- Jeffrey S. BanksJBJeffrey S. Banks
- Rangarajan K. SundaramRSRangarajan K. Sundaram
Open Access
- 1 October 1998
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 82 (2) , 293-323
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 24 references indexed in Scilit:
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