Is human existence worth its consequent harm?
Author:
Open Access
- 28 September 2007
- journal article
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 33 (10) , 573-576
Abstract
Benatar argues that it is better never to have been born because of the harms always associated with human existence. Non-existence entails no harm, along with no experience of the absence of any benefits that existence might offer. Therefore, he maintains that procreation is morally irresponsible, along with the use of reproductive technology to have children. Women should seek termination if they become pregnant and it would be better for potential future generations if humans become extinct as soon as humanely possible. These views are challenged by the argument that while decisions not to procreate may be rational on the grounds of the harm that might occur, it may equally rational to gamble under certain circumstances that future children would be better-off experiencing the harms and benefits of life rather than never having the opportunity of experiencing anything. To the degree that Benatar’s arguments preclude the potential rationality of any such gamble, their moral relevance to concrete issues concerning human reproduction is weakened. However, he is right to emphasise the importance of foreseen harm when decisions are made to attempt to have children.Keywords
This publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
- Better Never to Have Been2006
- A rational cure for prereproductive stress syndromeJournal of Medical Ethics, 2004
- Why it is not strongly irrational to have childrenJournal of Medical Ethics, 2004
- Human reproduction: irrational but in most cases morally defensibleJournal of Medical Ethics, 2004
- WRONGFUL LIFE, PROCREATIVE RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HARMLegal Theory, 1999
- Thinking about Human NeedNew Left Review, 1993
- Some Puzzles About the Evil of DeathPhilosophical Review, 1991
- A Theory of Human Need1991
- Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical1991
- A Theory of Justice1971